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An inconsistency between certain outcomes and uncertain incentives  
within behavioral methods   
 
In random–lottery incentive methods, the choices of certain (sure) 
outcomes are stimulated by uncertain lotteries.  This inconsistency 
is evident, but only recently revealed.  Certain and uncertain 
outcomes can differ from each other.  The revealed inconsistency 
can hide this possible difference.  The cause is:  under the condition 
of the uncertain incentive, the questioned subjects can treat a 
certain outcome as an uncertain one.  The considered critical 
empirical insight should be kept in mind by both theoreticians and 
practitioners.  It leads also to more general questions of comparison 
of sure and probable (uncertain) outcomes those should be clarified 
to increase our understanding of behavior problems.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
The present short article considers an inconsistency in the stimulation of 
certain (sure) outcomes by uncertain lotteries. Such stimulations are usual in 
behavioral incentive methods. This inconsistency leads to more general 
questions of comparison of sure and probable (uncertain) outcomes.  
The article develops the report Harin (2014).   
The article considers experimental results of well-known authors.  
The need for this consideration is grounded on the prevalence and 
usefulness of the random–lottery incentive systems and their results both in 
behavioral researches and in practical applications.  
 
 
2.  Two features of the experiments  
2.1.  Uncertain incentives 
 
Let us analyze one usual feature of behavioral experiments. Let us 
consider some typical descriptions of the experiments. One can see in the 
literature (the boldface is my own):   
Loewenstein, & Thaler (1989), page 188: “The students … were told that 
the experimenter would select and implement one of their choices at random.” 
Baltussen et al. (2012), page 424: “In the WRIS treatment, subjects play 
the game ten times, one of which for real payment. In the BRIS treatment, 
subjects play the game only once with a one-in-ten chance of real payment.”  
and page 425: “In both RIS treatments, a ten-sided die was thrown individually 
by each subject to determine her payment.”  
Other sources such as Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler (1991), Choi et. al 
(2007), Larkin, & Leider (2012),  Vossler, Doyon, & Rondeau (2012), Cox, 
Sadiraj, & Schmidt (2015), etc. give similar descriptions.  
So, subjects are stimulated by random incentives. This is a well-known 
feature of the behavioral experiments.  
Let us note that the stimulation (incentive) by a random payment selected 
from two or more alternatives may be called a random, uncertain stimulation. 
One may refer to it also as a stimulation by an uncertain incentive.  
Such a random incentive procedure is usually referred to as the random–
lottery incentive system (or the random lottery incentive system or random 
incentive system (RIS), or mechanisms “pay one randomly” (POR), etc.).  
 
 
2.2.  Certain outcomes 
 
One can see another feature in the literature (the boldface and 
underlining are my own):  
Starmer, & Sugden (1991), page 974: “subjects in groups B and C knew 
that they were taking part in a random–lottery experiment in which questions 
21 and 22 had equal chances of being for real.” and “One problem, which we 
shall call P', required a choice between two lotteries R' (for "riskier") and S' (for 
“safer”). R' gave a 0.2 chance of winning ₤10.00 and a 0.75 chance of winning 
₤7.00 (with the residual 0.05 chance of winning nothing); S' gave ₤7.00 for 
sure.”   
Andreoni, & Sprenger (2012), page 3365: “One choice for each subject 
was selected for payment by drawing a numbered card at random. Subjects 
were told to treat each decision as if it were to determine their payments.” and 
page 3366: “Section I provided a testable hypothesis for behavior across certain 
and uncertain intertemporal settings.”   
Other sources such as Holt, & Laury (2002), Harrison et al. (2005), 
Abdellaoui et al. (2011), Cox, Sadiraj, & Schmidt (2015),  etc. give the same.   
So, the random incentive procedures are used not only in the uncertain but 
in the certain situations too. Let us consider this more closely.  
 
 
3.  An inconsistency between the two features 
3.1.  An inconsistency between  
the certain outcomes and uncertain incentives   
 
So, the well-known feature of the behavioral experiments is that subjects 
are stimulated by random incentives.   
Let us consider stimulations with this uncertain incentive separately for 
uncertain and certain choices. 
Suppose, that subjects choose an uncertain choice, that is, a choice whose 
probability is strictly less than  1  (and strictly more than  0).  In this case, the 
choice and the incentive are of the same type.  
Suppose, that the subjects choose a certain choice that is, a choice whose 
probability is strictly equal to  1.  Here, the choice and the incentive are of the 
essentially different types.  The choice is certain but the incentive is uncertain.  
In general, certain and uncertain outcomes can differ from each other.   
Moreover, one should emphasize:  this uncertain incentive can call into 
question the certain outcome.  That is, under the condition of the uncertain 
incentive, the subjects can treat a certain outcome as an uncertain one. 
Therefore, there is an evident inconsistency between the above two 
features:  the inconsistency between the certain type of the choice and the 
uncertain type of the incentive.  
Therefore, the correctness of the use of uncertain incentives for certain 
outcomes cannot be unquestionable.  
One may call this problem the “certain–uncertain” inconsistency.  
This inconsistency is a fundamental and methodological one.  Moreover, it 
raises a more general question of comparison of sure and probable outcomes.  
This question can embrace much more fields than its origin.   
This inconsistency is evident but the author of this article has found no 
mention of it (or of similar questions) in the literature (except of author’s works 
from 2014): see, e.g., Andreoni, & Sprenger (2012), Vossler, Doyon, & 
Rondeau (2012), Baltussen et al. (2012), Cox, Sadiraj, & Schmidt (2015), 
Vrijdags, & Marchant (2015).  
The inconsistency was revealed in Harin (2014).   
 
 
3.2.  A role of the incentives   
 
Incentives have been widely discussed in economics (see, e.g., Starmer, & 
Sugden, 1991; Fehr, & Falk, 2002; Holt, & Laury, 2002; Baltussen et al., 2012; 
Larkin, & Leider, 2012; Cox, Sadiraj, & Schmidt, 2015).   
Do incentives influence the choices made by the subjects?   
The correct answer needs a special investigation.  However, one may be 
sure that if incentives did not have any influence on the choices made by the 
subjects, then there would be no reason to use such incentives.   
Moreover, e.g., Table 4 in Cox, Sadiraj, & Schmidt (2015) manifests the 
essential differences in the same risk preferences revealed by subjects between 
various incentive mechanisms (in addition to other results of this article).  This 
supports the positive answer to the question of the subsection.   
Therefore, one may not exclude that incentives can influence the choices 
made by a subject.  
Therefore, one may not exclude that an uncertain incentive can influence 
the choice of the certain outcome.  Therefore, one may not exclude that an 
uncertain incentive can call into question the certain outcome, at least partially.  
 
 
4.  Experimental confirmations  
of the “certain–uncertain” inconsistency 
4.1.  The experiment of Starmer, & Sugden (1991)   
 
Conditions.  One can see the following in the description of the well-
known experiment of Starmer & Sugden (1991):  
Page 974: “For groups A and D, this page began with an underlined text 
stating that question 22 would be played for real. For groups B and C, the 
corresponding text stated that one of the two questions would be played for real 
and that which question was to played out would be decided at the end of the 
experiment in the following way. The subject would roll a six-sided die. If the 
number on the die was 1, 2, or 3, then question 21 would be played; if the 
number was 4, 5, or 6, question 22 would be played.  … 
One problem, which we shall call P', required a choice between two 
lotteries R' (for "riskier") and S' (for "safer"). R' gave a 0.2 chance of winning 
₤10.00 and a 0.75 chance of winning ₤7.00 (with the residual 0.05 chance of 
winning nothing); S' gave ₤7.00 for sure.” 
Results.  So, in the R'-S' problem, R' gives  ₤10.00×0.2+₤7.00×0.75 = 
₤7.25.  S' gives  ₤7.00×1 = ₤7.00.  Here  R' = ₤7.25>S' = ₤7.00.   
Let us consider the results from table 2 on Page 976, those are of interest 
here (the boldface is my own): 
• Group = B, Incentive = Random lottery, R':S' = 19:21 
• Group = C, Incentive = Random lottery, R':S' = 22:18 
• Group = D, Incentive =         P' real,         R':S' = 13:27 
One can evaluate the percentages of the subjects choosing the uncertain 
outcome.  The total number of the subjects in each group is equal to  40 = 
19+21 = 22+18 = 13+27.  So, for the P' real incentive, the percentage is equal 
to  13/40~33%.  It differs evidently and essentially from the percentages  
19/40~48%  and  22/40=55%  for the Random lottery incentives.   
Deduction.  The percentages for random–lottery incentives (48%  and  
55%) differ evidently from the percentage for real incentives (33%).  So, one 
can easily deduce the random–lottery incentives can essentially modify and bias 
subjects’ choices in comparison with the real incentives, when these choices 
include certain outcomes.   
 
 
4.2.  The experiments of Cox, Sadiraj, & Schmidt (2015)   
 
Recent experiments of Cox, Sadiraj, & Schmidt (2015) also confirm the 
above deduction that the random lottery incentives can essentially modify 
subjects’ choices in comparison with the real incentives, when these choices 
include certain outcomes.  Note, some results of these experiments have the 
opposite directions of biases caused by the uncertain incentives.   
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
The main results and conclusions of the present article are:  
1)  The random–lottery incentive systems have the inner inconsistency 
between the certain outcomes and uncertain incentives.   
2)  Under the condition of an uncertain incentive, the subjects can behave 
toward certain outcomes as toward uncertain ones.  So, an uncertain incentive 
can call into question the certain outcome, at least partially.   
3)  The existing deductions from random–lottery incentive experiments, 
those include certain outcomes, cannot be unquestionably correct because of this 
“certain–uncertain” inconsistency.  All these reasons should be taken into 
account by theoreticians and practitioners as a possible source of mistakes.   
4)  The random–lottery incentive systems need additional independent 
analyses and/or investigations in the context of this inconsistency.   
5)  The raised general question of comparison of sure and probable 
outcomes needs further methodological development not only for theory.  It can 
concern also practical situations of, e.g., stimulations of desirable behaviour of 
both employees in organizations and organizations themselves.   
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